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"New"

Rights

Civil

Strategies for
Latino Political

Empowerment
Seth Racusen

Latinos became the largest "minority" group and significantly increased their political
representation in Massachusetts in the past decade.

power

is

Even with these

not nearly commensurate with the size of their population.

gains, their political

Many

aspects of

Latino political demographics, including a large immigrant population with low citizenship rates, high poverty rates,
to their underrepresentation.

have led many analysts

and dispersion across many

electoral districts, contribute

The political demographics facing Massachusetts Latinos

to prescribe alternative electoral

systems as avenues to achieve

and
"new"

increased political representation. This article reviews the critiques of the 1970s

1980s

civil rights redistricting strategies

and explores

the prospects that the

1990s strategies could offer Latinos in the six cities where they are highly concentrated
and at the state level. The author projects gains for most legislative bodies, but at a rate
lower than suggested by proportionality advocates.

Latinos became

the largest "minority" group

and gained a modicum of

political repre-

sentation in Massachusetts during the past decade. In contrast to 1983,

was only one elected

low the national pattern
It

there

representative, Massachusetts has eight Latino elected officials

and there are prospects for increased representation
representation.

when

1

in

in several districts.

2

These gains

which Latino population growth precedes increased

fol-

political

has occurred through the creation of Latino majority districts and

districts in which Latinos and other minority groups, usually blacks, have
combined to form political majorities.
Even with these gains, Latino municipal political power is not nearly commensurate

"rainbow"

with the size of the Latino population in the
trated.

Their underrepresentation

Latino elected

officials.

in all states except

emphasis on

New

litigation

is

cities

more marked

where Latinos

are highly concen-

at the state level,

which includes no

This also follows national patterns of Latino underrepresentation

Mexico. 3 Thus, one prominent analyst has suggested that the

and electoral

returns without the addition of

politics

some new

may have reached

"a point of diminishing

conceptualization, strategies, and approaches

for Latino politics in the 1990's." 4

This article examines one facet of such a

new

conceptualization for litigation and

electoral politics: the potential impact of alternative electoral systems for increased

Latino political representation in Massachusetts. Latino political demographics in

Massachusetts and
Seth Racusen

is

many

other states have led

a doctoral candidate

in political science,
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analysts to prescribe alternative
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"Latino political demographics in Massachusetts and
other states have led

many

analysts to prescribe

alternative electoral systems, not based

districts,

many

on small geographic

as more fruitful avenues to achieve increased

political representation,...

What impact might

these alternative

systems have upon the political representation of the
Latino community?"

— Seth Racusen

162

on small geographical districts, as more fruitful avenues to
achieve increased political representation. The key demographics factors that have
led to these proposals are the residential dispersion of the Latino community in many
municipalities and political districts of an increasingly multiethnic population. However,
electoral systems, not based

advocates for the alternative systems have not addressed the other aspects of the political

demographics of the Latino community. The alternatives are based on premises about

by population figures. Since
the Latino community has a high percentage of nonvoters, I ask, what impact might
these alternative systems have upon the political representation of the Latino community? I outline the critiques of the 1970s and 1980s civil rights strategies, present Latino
voters in comparison with the district systems structured

political

demographics

tive electoral

in Massachusetts,

and explore the prospective impact of

alterna-

systems on Massachusetts Latinos.

Critiques of Civil Rights Strategies

The Voting Rights Act (VRA) changed the shape of politics by significantly broadening
the demographic makeup of the electorate, restructuring the rules of the game, and making possible the vast increases in Latino and black elected officials. In the three decades

VRA and particularly since the 1974 amendment to include
number of black and Latino elected representatives has increased dramatiThe Latino community saw a threefold increase to more than 4,000 as of 1991. 5

since the passage of the

Latinos, the
cally.

The

and replaced

act attacked outright barriers to participation

cities

and counties with single-member

bination could comprise a majority of a

districts in

new

at-large districting in

which Latinos, blacks, or some com-

district.

Participation

The

participatory focus of civil rights litigation has successfully challenged

ers to the political participation

many

barri-

of blacks, Latinos, and Asians. This has included

efforts to eliminate outright barriers to participation: registration requirements, literacy
tests, poll tax,

many forms of Election Day intimidation.
Latino community do not vote. More than 5

English-language ballots, and

Nevertheless, large segments of the

million Latinos were noncitizens in 1990, the steepest participation obstacle facing the

community. To address

this obstacle, there

have been

calls for naturalization

campaigns,

targeted voter registration and mobilization, and including noncitizens in the electorate, particularly for local elections.

Rodolfo de

la

Garza and Louis DeSipio have pro-

posed allowing noncitizens to vote during the five-year waiting period for naturalization.

Those who

participate in municipal elections

would become

citizens

based on their vot-

ing and be exempted from the citizenship examination. DeSipio favors the inclusion

of noncitizens in

elections, while de la

all

Garza favors

it

only in municipal elections.

Their proposals seek to increase Latino citizenship rates by creating an incentive for
noncitizens to vote. 6

Noncitizen voting, neither mandated nor proscribed by the U.S. Constitution, has

been contingent on
states

from the

state politics.

late eighteenth

Noncitizens could vote in

century until 1926,

7

at least

twenty-two

when Arkansas was

the last state to

end it. During this period, noncitizen voting, provided as an incentive to stimulate
European immigration and settlement of the frontier, was accompanied by bilingual education on the prairies. Today, noncitizen voting is allowed in nine European

163

New England Journal

countries and
it
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New

Zealand, and in Chicago and

has also been approved in

Takoma

New York

Park, Maryland.

school board elections;

8

Voting eligibility requirements reflect a society's view toward
political rules, those for voting eligibility are changeable.

its

members. Like

Given the increasingly

national structure of the economy, considerable discussion of

all

inter-

new approaches toward

political participation, including the voting rights of noncitizens, is warranted.

Structures of Representation

The second focus of the
cast a

meaningful

ballot,

civil rights strategies

namely, to enable communities of black, Latino, and Asian

voters to effectively exercise their
trated

on moving from

being reevaluated has been the right to

at-large to

own

preferences.

single-member

Many

have concen-

litigation suits

districting

and influencing the shape

of the resulting redistricting boundaries.

The

courts have defined civil rights districts as remedies for specific circumstances.

A three-part

standard, established in the 1986 case Thornburgh

Gingles, requires that

v.

a district be created for a protected group, provided that the following conditions are

demonstrated:

•

The protected group

of an electoral

is sufficiently

large

and compact

to

form the majority

district.

•

That the protected group

•

That the "majority" must also have been politically cohesive and blocked the pref-

is

politically cohesive.

9
erences of the protected group.

It is

the

first

prong of the Gingles

test,

which has been

criticized for

denying the rights

of noncompact minorities to cast a meaningful ballot.
District representation has not

Asian

10

representation,

owing

proved to be the best remedy to increase Latino or

to residential dispersion.

ate a municipal- level Latino majority district in

11

It

Boston

was extremely

in 1983.

12

Where

difficult to credistricts

can be

constructed, they can effectively provide representation.
District
ty,

remedies are advantageous to the largest minority group in each municipali-

which has led

districts

and

to

concern that groups would have interests in distinctive electoral

structures, creating a structural basis for

competing electoral

Blacks in Florida, Latinos and Asians in California, and Asians in
tricting

New York

13

City redis-

have found their electoral interests conflicting with those of other groups. 14

Because many Latinos have been elected from rainbow
the largest group, these coalitions are
nity.

strategies.

For example, former

viewed as highly

state representative

districts

where blacks comprise

strategic for the Latino

commu-

Nelson Merced was elected from a

estimated to be about one-quarter Latino and almost half black. 15 But there

is

district

nothing

16
automatic about these coalitions, which are so strategic for Latino empowerment.

Indeed, one group's gain has

becomes increasingly
ics,

come

difficult as

at

the expense of another, a

each group becomes

larger.

To

dynamic

that

illustrate these

consider Pacific City, California, a small city whose population

is

dynam-

30 percent Asian,

10 percent Latino, and 4 percent black and whose school board has nine at-large

yielded a district

mem-

member, who is black. A lawsuit of Latinos and blacks
plan with two majority-minority districts. Asians, highly dispersed

bers and oniy one minority

164

within Pacific City, subsequently entered the process, favoring a modified at-large sys-

tem using cumulative

what

voting. In such circumstances,

rights, if any,

do noncompact

would one invoke to insist on
rights of compact and noncompact

minorities possess? If none, what democratic principle

geographical compactness?

If

how would

some,

minorities be evaluated simultaneously?
cities in

which two

sentation.

17

the

The complexities

are equally difficult in

equivalent-size minority groups are competing for political repre-

18

There are many examples of the potential contentiousness of current approaches to
resolving competing claims. While a few attorneys and scholars envision solutions

within the context of the Voting Rights Act to the questions about noncompact minorities

and competing claims over the shape of

foreseen nor adjudicable by the

act.

districts,

19

many view

these issues as neither

Boston's history has demonstrated that

it is

possible

to create multiethnic redistricting coalitions. Nonetheless, the complexities arising

from

communithese com-

multiple voting claims increase in places with larger Latino, black, and Asian
ties.

20

The projected growth of Latino and Asian communities suggests

that

plications will increase.

Even where

redistricting has

produced increased representation, there are concerns

about unintended consequences of the
that the increase in

district strategy.

Many

numbers of Latino (and black) elected

observers have noted

officials has not contributed to

sustained increased mobilization and participation, part of the original civil rights vision

which led

when

ing

VRA.

to the

Instead, participation follows a cyclical pattern, initially increas-

a civil rights district

tion rates, largely as a

created, then returning to relatively

is first

consequence of incumbency.

low participa-

21

Questions have also been raised about what minority officials can accomplish, given
the shape of U.S. politics. Latino and black elected officials
ily to

The

municipal and

racial

power.

23

state legislative bodies,

were elected primar-

whose limited power has been eroding. 22

dynamics existing within many of those bodies further

In

some

instances,

new

limits minority

been devised to limit the power of minority

rules have

officeholders.

After the
a small

it

Mexican- American

woman was

Texas county, the board changed

Whereas

now

first

prior to her election, any one

would require

a

its

elected to the school board in

rules for putting items

member could

on the agenda.

put an item on the agenda,

second before issues would be considered. 24

number of firstballot
the white candidates. It was the tradition
in Cincinnati that the council member with the largest vote would be elected by
the council to serve as mayor
After much political maneuvering, the white
council member with the most seniority was chosen mayor. 25
Berry [an incumbent black

city councilor] received the largest

choices — more than any of

.

.

.

Impeding minority officeholders need not be
"pockets" of

civil rights structures

which places extreme

limits

as explicit as these cases. Instead, the

operate within a majoritarian environment,

on what can be achieved. The "white backlash"

the California Proposition 13 initiative can be

viewed

that led to

as a majoritarian response to

by the black liberal Speaker Willie Brown, which
for the decade before the initiative. Bruce Cain argues

the California assembly, presided over

was perceived
that

as quite liberal

such majoritarian "adjustments" will inevitably limit

civil rights efforts.

26

Lani Guinier has advanced the same argument with a different emphasis. In her view,
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such "disproportionate majority power"

is

fundamentally "unlegitimate" because major-

ity rule

has always presumed a "reciprocity claim," which she states as follows:

"While

pluralist theories

of democracy do contemplate minority losses, they do not nec-

essarily envision a minority that never wins."

The

relationship

27

between majority rule and minority

rights

was

at the

center of James

Madison's warnings about the danger of "majority tyranny" and much of the

liberal

theory of the eighteenth century. Jean- Jacques Rousseau's Social Contract was motivat-

ed by concern about

how

an individual could rationally abide by a majority decision

with which he disagreed, considered a litmus test of the legitimacy of a representative

democracy. According to Rousseau, the majority,

if

animated by the general will of the

would always represent the best decision, which the rational individual
would recognize. Guinier has argued that these theorists presumed that the legitimacy of
majority rule rested with the hope that a loser today could become a winner tomorrow.
The status of a permanent minority, whose interests are consistently outvoted, violates
population,

this reciprocity tenet

off

between majority rule and minority

The emerging

new

within majoritarianism. Thus, Guinier has called for a

trade-

rights.

critique of the civil rights

movement

points to four principal problems

with single-member voting; (1) the impact of incumbency, which depresses voter
turnout,

is

enough

to

particular strong in districts, (2) dispersed minorities will not be

compose a

may

multiple groups

district; (3) the difficulties

door of the

of mediating between the claims of

increase tensions between groups; and (4) minority elected officials

encounter unresponsive white legislators.
at the

civil rights

Many

facets of this critique should not be left

movement, but rather be regarded

majoritarian limitations of U.S. political institutions that

To

compact

date, Latino analysts

it

as consequences of the

did not challenge.

have focused primarily on the limited applicability of the

Voting Rights Act to the specific barriers to the political participation of the Latino community.

One important

gle-member

analyst

who

has

commented on

the structural issues views sin-

districting as the best, although imperfect alternative

because

it

produces

the greatest levels of representation for Latinos and blacks, given contemporary
28

To address the effects of incumbency on participation, some recommend more
influence districts, in which Latinos are not a majority but a sizable minority, with more
than 20 percent of a district's adult population. According to this view, Latino participation would increase because multiple candidates would have to compete for their votes,
stimulating mobilization. Latinos would also supposedly be more highly motivated to
participate in influence districts than in safe districts. But influence districts would not
29
lead to much increased representation. The proposal for influence districts partially
realities.

responds to the

VRA critique.

However, the critique of majoritarianism has not been substantively addressed by
these analysts.

New York

Angelo Falcon, president of the

Political Study, has criticized

"community and group
and the

Institute for Puerto

Rican Policy

in

and one of the principal investigators of the important Latino National
Guinier for underestimating the significance between

solidarity" in politics,

political system."

30

and those "linkages between community

But does group solidarity really emanate from residential

proximity? Guinier argues that interest groups tend to be more mobilized in alternative
systems. Within

much

important commentary, such as Luis Fraga's thoughtful discus-

sion about the importance of Latino advocacy of an informed public interest, lies an
implicit acceptance of the majoritarian biases of the contemporary allocation of power.

Nonmajoritarian systems offer fairer representational possibilities for dispersed

166

politi-

cal minorities

and eliminate the potentially fractious decentennial redistricting

fights.

power inherent in redistricting moves from the planning arena to the
electoral arena. Competing claims and demographic changes are mediated through electoral alliances and would not require new district boundaries.
Key to these claims is a presumption that a dispersed minority group would be better
The

allocation of

represented under the alternative systems.
cities

Much

of the increase in minority presence in

has been due to the growth of U.S. Asian and Latino communities, both having

low registration and voting

rates

and facing many participation hurdles. While the

alter-

native systems have the potential to provide representation to dispersed groups, those

groups must have sufficient voting power, which has not been clearly established.

would supposedly benefit from the

Instead, the very groups that

ticipate in electoral politics at

argues that nonvoters would

much lower

still

levels.

Lani Guinier,

alternative systems par-

who

noted this problem,

stand to gain from alternative systems because the sys-

which they could participate, and create a qualitatively
31
different environment that would generate more responsive public policy. But would
groups with few voters actually lose representation in a system based on quotas of vot-

tems would mobilize groups,

in

would this represent a realistic option for Latinos or Asians?
This article reports on one aspect of Guinier's broader proposals: What impact might
alternative electoral systems have upon the representation of a disperse minority group,
Latinos in Massachusetts, which faces many barriers to participation? While much of
ers? If the

answer

is

yes,

her other arguments warrant further examination, the empirical exploration that follows
is

an important

test for

adequate consideration of structural alternatives.

Latino Political Demographics in Massachusetts
Despite

its

rapid expansion during the 1980s, the Massachusetts Latino electorate

appears less mobilized than that of other large states.

From an

estimated 19,959 regis-

grew two and a half times in just eight years
to a total of approximately 48,510 voters in 1990. During this period, the Latino electorate expanded from 0.7 percent to 1.6 percent of the total electorate, (see Table 1)
The Latino electorate would be still larger
approximately 2 percent of the total

tered voters in 1982, the Latino electorate

Massachusetts electorate

—

—

figures cited above, based

if several methodological problems were corrected. The
on the U.S. Census Current Population Surveys (CPS) of

1982-1990, underestimate the Massachusetts Latino electorate

at

any given time

because of the continual undercounting of the Latino population. The 1990 electoral
data projected population estimates and miscalculated Latino adults in the state by
32
26,374, according to the 1990 census. Second, that census, according to another census

report,

undercounted the Latino population by 7.3 percent. 33 The adjusted figures (see

Table 2) project nearly 61,000 registered voters with a turnout of 49,000 in 1990.

When compared

with Latino electorates in other states with large Latino populations,

Massachusetts Latinos have been participating
istration rates, the

tion for these three

were

lower

rates.

key indicator of participation, for Latinos

which they are given
larger states

at

Figure

1

presents the reg-

in the twelve states for

1988-1992 CPS. The national averages of Latino registraelection years varied between 32 percent and 36 percent. Most of the

at

in the

or above those levels during

more densely populated communities tend

to

all

three of the election years. Larger,

be more mobilized because of the structure

of the U.S. political system. California, with the lowest Latino participation rates, and

Massachusetts, with the next lowest rates, do not conform to these national trends in
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Table 1

The Growing Massachusetts Latino Electorate, 1982-1992
All Latino

Adults

Latino Turnout

Latino Registered Voters

As Percentage
of All

As Percentage

Registered
Voters

Year
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992

120,232
67,000
109,975
142,240
154,000
124,000

of All Voters

0.69%
0.62%
0.66%
1.30%
1.56%
0.86%

19,959
19,000
19,466
40,965
48,510
28,000

0.51%
0.56%
0.71%
1.09%
1.47%
0.61%

11,663
15,000
15,177
30,724
38,654
18,000

Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Voting and Registration in the Election of 1982, Current Population
Reports Series P-20, No. 383. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office (hereafter USGPO), 1983;
Voting and Registration in the Election of 1984, Current Population Reports Series P-20, No. 405 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1985); Voting and Registration in the Election of 1986, Current Population Reports Series
P-20, No. 414 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1987); Voting and Registration in the Election of 1988, Current
Population Reports Series P-20, No. 440 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1989; Voting and Registration in the
Election of 1990, Current Population Reports Series P-20, No. 453 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1991, Voting
and Registration in the Election of 1992, Current Population Reports Series P-20, No. 466 (Washington,
D.C.:

USGPO,

1993).

Figure J

Registration Rates for the Latino Electorate of
the Twelve Largest States, 1988-1992
As Percentage

of Latino Voting

Age Population

100%

80%

60%

40%

20%

0%
California

New Mexico

Arizona

1988

Texas

Florida

New York
New Jersey

Mass.

Illinois

Colorado

1990

Conn.

1992

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, P20-400, P20-453, and P20-466.
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Table 2

The Massachusetts Latino Electorate

1990

in

Estimate

Estimate

1:

CPS 1990

CPS 1990

Corrected
with 1990

for 1990

Also Corrected

Census
Undercount^

Census
Data 3

CPS 1990
Latino Residents, 18+
(percentage of total residents)

154,000
(3.43%)

180,374
(3.87%)

193,541
(4.21%)

Latino Registered Voters
(percentage of all registered voters)

48,510
(1.56%)

56,818
(1.77%)

60,965
(1.90%)

Latinos Voting
(percentage of

38,654
(1.47%)

45,274
(1.87%)

48,579
(2.00%)

all

voters)

2:

a Estimate

1 applies the registration and voting rates reported in the 1990 CPS to the population figures in
PL94-171.
^Estimate 2 applies the same registration and voting rates to the population figures in PL94-171, adjusted
by the Census Bureau's estimate of the undercount of Latinos and the overall population.

large states. Massachusetts Latinos participated at rates comparable with Latinos nation-

number of California Latinos compensates for
the relatively low rate of their participation; the Massachusetts Latino community is not
of that magnitude. I explore below some of the possible reasons for the lower participawide only

in the

1990

The

election.

tion of Massachusetts, but

it is

large

important to note that there

electoral participation. In their homelands, Latinos
I

go

is

nothing Latino about low

to the polls at

much

higher rates. 34

use registration to measure participation here because registered voters, whatever

White registered voters participated at a slightly
Latino counterparts in the 1992 elections; compare the turnout

their race, vote in similar proportions.

higher rate than their

rates for white registered voters

(90.7%) and Latino registered voters (82.5%t). The per-

centage of registered voters that did not vote in 1992

from a low of 4 percent for the Asian community

is

consistent across the electorates,

to a high of 7 percent in the white

electorate.

What accounts

for differences in registration? Within each electorate, there is a rela-

tively consistent percentage of adults

who

are not registered for reasons other than citi-

zenship, from a low of 24 percent of Asians to a high of 31 percent for blacks.

stands out are the differences in the relative sizes of the

What

noncitizen population — 45

per-

40 percent Latinos were not citizens in 1992, compared with 5 percent each of blacks and whites. For all these reasons, the overall participation profiles of
Latinos and Asians are quite similar, as are the participation portraits for the black and
cent of Asians and

Puerto Rican communities. 35

Registration Rate Differences
If registered voters

of

all

races vote at similar rates, what accounts for the differences

numbers of registered voters? In particular, what accounts for the differences
between the Latino registered voters in Massachusetts and those in the other major
in the
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The four

factors that depress the rate are the high level of residential dispersion,

the youthfulness of the population, high poverty levels within the community, and the

high numbers of immigrants and relatively low rates of citizenship. 36

None of these

fac-

tors indicate that there is anything "Latino" about nonparticipation; they point instead to

the barriers to political participation of U.S. Latinos.

Residential Patterns

Massachusetts Latinos are highly dispersed, residing primarily in white majority areas

and secondarily in multiethnic or rainbow

areas. Fifty-one thousand, or 18 percent,

of Massachusetts Latinos live in three cities with a large Latino population: Chelsea,

Holyoke, and Lawrence; 41 percent

live in six

rainbow

cities: Springfield,

Boston,

Lowell, Lynn, Cambridge, and Brockton, in which there are also significant numbers of
blacks and Asians.

of concentration.

The

other 41 percent live in the rest of the state, outside these areas

37

To portray the

residential patterns,

I

sorted the Massachusetts political precincts into

the following mutually exclusive categories:

•

Safe

65 percent of the adult population

is

Latino.

•

Majority

50 percent of the adult population

is

Latino.

•

Plurality

33 percent of the adult population

is

Latino, and Latinos are the

20 percent of the adult population

is

Latino.

10 percent of the adult population

is

Latino, and whites are less than

largest group.
•

Influence

•

Rainbow

50 percent.
•

Others

It is

All other precincts

important to distinguish between the precinct, the basic unit of politics, and the

political district,

which

is

composed of

precincts.

It is

possible, for example, for a La-

tino to live in a precinct categorized as other, but vote in an influence district in

the Latino population

is

which

20 percent or more. This categorization scheme uses precincts,

not districts, which could overstate the degree of dispersion.

high level of residential dispersion of the Latino population

Even with
is

this caution, the

evident in the data.

(65%) lived in places where
Latinos comprised less than 10 percent of the population. Only 12 percent lived in
precincts in which Latinos were a majority. Approximately one in five Latinos lived
In 1990, almost two-thirds of Massachusetts Latinos

in

rainbow or influence precincts.
Table 3 presents the distribution of the Latino population in six

rence,

cities:

Chelsea,

Law-

and Holyoke, with large populations of Latinos, and Springfield, Boston,

and Lowell, the rainbow

from Table 3

cities

with the highest concentration of Latinos.

where the

It is

evident

990 Latino population exceeded 30
concentrations of the Latino community. In each,

that in the three cities

1

were substantial
Chelsea, Lawrence, and Holyoke, districts could plausibly be created to provide political
representation. Springfield and Boston showed a few areas of concentration, but many
more rainbow or influence precincts, and Lowell had only two precincts with any Latino

percent, there

concentration.
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Table 3

Distribution of Latino Population by Categorization of Precincts
in Six Large Massachusetts Cities
Safe 3

Majority b

Plural

Influence

*

Rainbow e

Other^
4
14
8
47

Chelsea

Lawrence
Holyoke

4

Springfield

4

1

1

9
42

Boston
Lowell

194
33

1

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census Public

Law

94-171, Data

File,

All

10

30
14

64
252
35

1990.

a Safe

65% of adult population is Latino.
50% of adult population is Latino.
c Plurality 33% of adult population is Latino, and Latinos are the largest group.
"Influence 20% of the adult population is Latino.
e Rainbow 10% of the adult population is Latino, and whites are less than 50%.
^Majority

'Others

All

other precincts.

Most U.S. Latino officials reside in safe, majority, plurality, or rainbow districts; in
Massachusetts, most Latino elected officials reside in majority districts. Representative
Merced, however, came from a rainbow district. In Lawrence, Chelsea, and Holyoke,
Latinos are the single large minority group; in Boston, Lowell, and Springfield, they are
part of a
cities

demographic rainbow. Table 4 displays Latino population estimates for these

and for Massachusetts.

Table 4

Latino Political Demographics in Six Cities and State
Latino Population
Overall 8

Voting
(VAP) b

Age

Voting

Age

Electorate

Citizens

(VAC)b

Lawrence
Chelsea
Holyoke
Springfield

Boston
Lowell

Massachusetts House
Massachusetts Senate

41.6%
31.4%
31.1%
16.9%
10.8%
10.2%
4.8%
4.8%

29.1%
23.1%
18.7%
10.9%
8.4%
6.5%
3.9%
3.9%

21.2%
16.8%
18.6%
10.7%
5.8%
5.4%
2.9%
2.9%

18.3%
13.8%
13.7%
7.4%
4.7%
4.5%
2.0%
2.0%

a Public

Law 94-171 Data File, 1990.
b Estimated for each town and state from 1990 Census of Population, Social and Economic Characteristics,
Report 1990, CP-2-23, 1993, Table 192. Latino citizenship for each town was estimated as follows: Holyoke
(95.7%), Springfield (94.8%), Lowell (85.2%), Lawrence (70.1%), Boston (69.0%), and Chelsea (68.9%)
c Estimated by applying statewide voting
data from Voting and Registration in the Election of 1990, CPS
Report P-20, 453, 1991, to estimated Voting Age Citizens in previous column.

The Latino voting age population (VAP) is substantially smaller than its share of the
which indicates the overall youth of the Latino population as com-

overall population,
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pared with other populations. Latinos represent the youngest population of

groups in the six

cities! In

all

ethnic

Holyoke, Lawrence, Lowell, and Springfield, half or almost

half of the Latino communities were below voting age. These figures were between

twice and three times the rate for the white community. The youngest Latino communities,

with predominantly Puerto Rican populations, are Holyoke, Springfield, and

Lowell.

The Latino voting age citizens category estimates the citizenship rate among Latino
adults. Holyoke and Springfield, whose Latino communities are overwhelmingly Puerto
Rican, show high citizenship rates. The three cities with large Dominican or Central
American populations have much lower citizenship rates. Large numbers of Central
Americans reside in Boston and Chelsea. Many Dominicans, who are primarily located
in Lawrence and Boston, are noncitizens. Much of the 1980s Latino population growth
in Massachusetts resulted from the migration of Central Americans, whose noncitizenship rate is much higher than that of Mexicans or Cubans.
Latinos generally are less likely than European immigrants to become naturalized
after five years of U.S. residence: for example, 40 percent of naturalized Mexicans wait
twenty-five years or more before naturalizing. Of those who become citizens, apparently
81 percent register to vote. 38 Noncitizenship is not unique to Mexicans: 70 percent of
Colombians, Dominicans, and Salvadorans also do not apply for naturalization once
39
they become eligible.
Poverty

and

Citizenship

Citizenship

is

much higher among
with some college. Nearly

highly correlated with social class. Noncitizenship

those with less than a fifth-grade education than for those

compared with about one-

three-quarters of Latinos with advanced degrees are citizens,
third of those with only a fifth-grade education.

Massachusetts Latinos,

who

40

This

is

is

particularly true of

are believed to be the poorest of

all

such U.S. populations. 41

Poverty, the low Latino citizenship rate, and the vast increase in Central

American

immigration in the second half of the 1980s explain the lower participation of the
Massachusetts Latino electorate in comparison with other large
Electoral participation

which greatly
at

states.

also highly correlated with social class in the United States,

is

affects Latino

communities.

One

important study found that blacks voted

higher rates than whites, and, after controlling for citizenship, age, education, and

income, that Mexican participation was comparable to the national average. 42 In other
words, the nonclass factors
ticipation, citizenship,

commonly thought

to

be associated with lower rates of par-

and age of the community turn out

to

be strongly correlated with

social class.

Another aspect of the influence of
vote at

much

higher rates than those

class is that Latinos

who

doxical situation in which Latinos vote at
are

most highly concentrated, and

at

This also brings us to the question,

who

live in central cities.

much lower rates

43

live outside central cities

This creates a para-

in the places

where they

higher rates in the places of less concentration.

What

is

the potential impact of alternative electoral

systems on Massachusetts Latinos?

The Impact of Alternative

Electoral Systems

As previously noted, Massachusetts Latinos are a highly dispersed minority group and
face many obstacles to participation. The following discussion examines the general
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Table 5

Latino Population and Legislative Representation for
Six City Councils and Massachusetts State Legislature

Popi Nation

Indices of
Proportionality

Representatives

As
As

Percentage

Percentage

Lawrence

Springfield

Boston
Lowell

Senate

9
9
15
9
13
9

House-1990
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census Public

Law

1

1

94-171, Data

a Additive: the share (percentage) of representation

bounded by the Latino population of the
negative number indicating underrepresentation.

centage

is

is

11.1%
22.2%
6.7%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.6%

1

2

40
160
160

House

Chamber

Latino

All

41.6%
31.4%
31.1%
16.9%
10.8%
10.2%
4.8%

29,237
9,018
13,573
26,528
61,955
10,499
287,549

Chelsea
Holyoke

of Legislative

of City

Total

File,

Additive 3

Ratio b

30.5%
09.2%
24.4%
16.9%
10.8%
10.2%
4.8%
4.8%
4.2%

26.7%
70.8%
21.4%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
12.5%

1990.

subtracted from the share of the population. This perwith 0% as proportionate representation and a

city,

^Ratio: the share of representation is divided by the share of the population. This figure generally varies
between and 100%, with the latter indicating representational equity.

claim of proportionality advocates that dispersed populations would be more highly rep-

many

resented under alternative voting systems, particularly in communities with
nonvoters.
Political representation is generally

measured by comparing the percentage of Latino

elected officials with the percentage of a Latino population in a given region or state.

44

This definition does not require or even imply virtual representation, namely, that only a
Latino can represent Latinos.

been able

As communities of Latino
by choosing

to vote meaningfully

Latino elected officials have increased.

their

own

voters have been increasingly

representatives, the

One would have

to

assume

numbers of

that Latinos are less

likely than the overall population to vote for a Latino to expect another result.

Most Latinos

are elected

from the majority

or anticipation of, voting rights

suits.

districts generally created in

According

Elected Officials, the typical Latino official's constituency
Texas, which has
constituency

is

more Latino

one of two patterns: four at-large school
Springfield,

and four district-based

national trends.

cities

is

to,

of Latino

55 percent Latino. In

representatives than any other state, the typical official's

73 percent Latino! Massachusetts Latino

These numbers for the

response

to the National Association

officials in

officials

have been elected from

Lawrence, Chelsea, Holyoke, and

city councilors in

Lawrence, Chelsea, and Holyoke.

with the largest Latino concentrations are in keeping with

The gender of the Latino

bers and four male city councilors,

is

officials,

four female school committee

mem-

also in keeping with national trends of females

disproportionately serving on school boards. 45

The Latino population and council representation for the six cities in the study and
the state of Massachusetts are shown in Table 5. The expectation that increased popula-
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tion produces increased political representation

There

is

generally confirmed by the data.

council representation in Lawrence, Chelsea, and Holyoke, where the Latino

is

population exceeds 30 percent and constitutes majority precincts (see Table
the fact that representation

is

3).

However,

higher in Chelsea than Lawrence suggests that the popula-

must be considered a tendency, not a law of politics.
Comparisons of the Latino share of the overall population with the Latino share of

tion impact

council representatives indicate that Latinos, underrepresented in Chelsea, are severely

underrepresented in the other five

cities.

Two

indexes of proportionality are usually

46

computed in the literature. The additive index subtracts the Latino population percentage from the representation percentage. The resulting figure varies according to the
size of the population:

percent represents equitable representation, a positive percent-

age represents overrepresentation, and a negative percentage represents underrepresenta-

The

method shows Latinos to be highly underrepresented in Lawrence
(-30.5%) and Holyoke (-24.4%), where there are Latino elected officials, and less underrepresented in Boston (-10.8%), Springfield (-16.9%), or Lowell (-10.2%), where there
are none. This method is less sensitive to gains in representation in cities with a more
concentrated community. The ratio of representation to population divides the percentage of representation by the percentage of the population and varies from percent
for no representation to 100 percent for equitable representation and more than 100 percent for overrepresentation. The ratio method shows Latinos to be most highly represented in Chelsea (70.8%). However, this method, which does not reflect population diftion.

additive

ferences in cities with no representation, classifies Springfield, Boston, and Lowell as

equally underrepresented.

47

Hence, both calculations are given here.

There are no Latino elected

officials

above the municipal

level.

Table 4 also presents

the indexes of representation for the current legislature and that of

Merced held

office.

Even when Merced was a member,

1

990,

the ratio for the

when Nelson

House of

Representatives of 12.5 percent indicates that the Latino population was eight times
larger than

its

share of legislators. Restated, proportionate representation for the 1990

Latino population would have been eight statewide representatives.

Threshold of Representation
Political scientists estimate the possible

"threshold of representation," or the
date.

outcomes of

electoral systems

number of voters necessary

by calculating the

to elect a given candi-

Although there are many types of proportional systems, the two most relevant are

employed in Cambridge, and cumulative voting,
a few small U.S. locales. The calculation for this threshold, which

proportional representation, which

which

is in

force in

consistent across the systems,

is

is

calculated as follows:

Threshold =

The values

is

1

/(Seats

+

4X

1)

for this formula are given in Table 6. In a single-member district,

50 per-

cent of the voters are necessary to produce an electoral triumph in a final election.
In modified at-large systems, such as cumulative voting or proportional representation,

the threshold

is

calculated on the basis of the

number of

representatives being elected. In

an election for three at-large seats under a modified system, 25 percent of the voters

could elect a representative. Consider the case of Alamogordo,

New

Mexico, 21 percent

Moncada, a Latina, to the Board of Alderman in 1987.
Cumulative voting was adopted the same year to elect the three at-large aldermen.
Latino, which elected Inez
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Table 6

Threshold of Political Representation
Voters

Seats

Voters

9
10

0.100

11

0.083
0.077

7

0.500
0.333
0.250
0.200
0.167
0.143
0.125

8

0.111

Seats
1

2

3
4
5
6

Source: Richard

L.

Under

this

12
13
14
15

Engstrom, "The Single Transferable Vote:

Dilution," University of

0.091

An

San Francisco Law Review 27 (Summer

0.071
0.067

0.063

Alternative

Remedy

for Minority Vote

1993).

system, voters can express the strength of their preferences and cast

votes for one candidate or split their votes

among two

all

three

or three candidates. According to

Ms. Moncada's election, she received 73 percent of the Latino vote, with
Latinos casting on average 2.6 voters for her. She also received about 22 percent of the
white vote. The intensity of that Latino vote suggests the potential use of cumulative
analysis after

49
voting by a minority.

In Cambridge, another modified at-large system, proportional representation
to elect the nine members of the City Council, yielding a
10.1 percent. Under this system, each voter expresses his

the candidates. If a voter's

first

choice

is

ferable vote, continues until

all

used

or her preferences by ranking

defeated or elected with an excess of votes dur-

ing the counting, the second preference on that ballot
uting the secondary preferences, which

is

threshold of representation of

is

why

is tallied.

the system

is

The process of

redistrib-

also called the single trans-

candidates have been eliminated or elected. Thus,

all

voters can exercise a preference.

Blacks,

who comprised

13.5 percent of the

1990 Cambridge population, have been

able to elect a representative under this system even

when

their share of the population

was under the threshold. Proportional representation has also been used since 1970 in
the community school board elections in New York City. Latino and black representation on these boards has approximated the Latino and black shares of the overall population for the twenty-plus years since. In 1983, for example, Latinos were 20 percent of
the city's population and held 17 percent of the community school board seats. New
York City Latinos were not as well represented on any other municipal or state body. 50
The Latino population (see Table 4) in each of the six study cities exceeds this
threshold of representation for the city councils
used. These councils vary from nine

and

fifteen in

cities

members

if

modified at-large systems had been

in four

of the

cities to thirteen in

Boston

Holyoke. The thresholds of representation are 10 percent for the four

with a council of nine, 7.1 percent in Holyoke, and 6.3 percent for Boston.

While the Latino population is larger than the thresholds for representation in these
most important indicators for the outcome of elections held under alternative

cities, the

systems are the numbers of voters. The 1990 Latino electorate (see Table 4) exceeded
their thresholds of representation only in
nicipalities

Lawrence, Chelsea, and Holyoke, the mu-

where Latinos were already elected through

district representation.

closer examination of the possible impact of the alternative systems
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Table 7

Proportionate Representation for Six City Councils
and Massachusetts State Legislature
Proportionate Representation Based on

Voting

Voting

Overall

Age

Age

Population 3

Population 3

Citizens*3

Current
RepreElectorate

sentatives

Lawrence

3.7

2.6

1.9

1.6

1.0

Chelsea
Holyoke

2.8

2.1

1.5

1.2

2.0

4.7

2.8

2.8

1.2

1.0

Springfield

1.5

1.0

1.0

0.7

0.0

Boston

1.4

1.1

0.8

0.4

0.0

Lowell

0.9

0.6

0.5

0.4

0.0

Massachuset ts Senate
Massachusetts House

1.9

1.5

1.2

0.6

0.0

7.7

6.2

4.7

2.4

0.0

Note: "Proportionate" legislative representation estimates the
portionate to each population factor.

amount

of representation that

would be

pro-

3 Public

Law 94-171 Data File, 1990.
b 1990 Census of Population, Social and Economic Characteristics, Report 1990, CP-2-23, 1993.
c Voting and Registration in the Election of 1990, CPS Report P-20, 453, 1991.

Proportionate Representation

The impact of alternative systems

is

more thoroughly presented

in Table 7,

which

esti-

mates proportionate council representation based on four population factors (see Table
4)

and current council size

if

modified at-large systems were used. 51 Because of the par-

ticipation factors noted above, the estimates

based on Latino voting age citizens and the

Latino electorate provide the best figures for proportionate representation. Projections

based on voting age population would be relevant for circumstances in which the voting
rights of noncitizens are

under consideration. While

politics

would play

the key role in

determining the ultimate size of the Latino electorate, the estimates of the current electorate

and citizens are the most accurate indicators for appraising possible outcomes.

Because of the Latino undercount by the 1990 census and continued population
growth since that time, the percentage of voting age citizens listed above may be the
best indicator of the electoral strength of the Latino communities in the various municipalities. In addition,

an increase in participation of approximately 7 percent could be

which controlled for the many
and idiosyncratic differences between European electoral systems, found that

projected by the change in electoral system.
cultural

One

study,

the incentives for voting under systems of proportional representation resulted in a 7

percent expansion of the electorates. 52 If applied to Table 7, the estimates would slightly

exceed the column for voting age

citizens. Since

such an increase would bring the

Latino electorate in Massachusetts to a level commensurate with Latino electorates in
other states, such a projection seems warranted.

Table 7 suggests that Latinos would gain in virtually
ered in this
(2)

article.

all

These contexts might be categorized as

municipal councils with Latinos elected from

districts,

the legislative bodies consid(1) state legislative bodies,

and

(3)

municipal councils

without elected Latino representation.

The

greatest gains

legislature,

from moving

where between

three

to

and

modified at-large systems would occur in the

six representatives
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state

might be elected. This creates a

paradoxical situation in which the greatest potential gain could occur

which

is

at the

higher level,

considerably more difficult to change.

The municipal councils to which Latinos have been elected through districts offer a
more modest increase of two additional representatives. More representation would not
where there has been discussion of incorporating noncitizen voting to offset an otherwise anticipated possible decrease. In Lawrence and Holyoke, there
could be representational increases, dependent upon the degree of mobilization of the

be expected

The wide

electorate.

Holyoke

in Chelsea,

is

difference between the voting age citizens and the electorate in

indicative of the

Holyoke, the voting age

low voter turnout

citizens,

would be

in that city.

large

enough

The

eligible electorate of

to elect three representatives

under an alternative system.

While the projected gains for Springfield, Boston, and Lowell, the three municipalities without Latino elected council members, are nominal, a modified at-large system
could be expected to open access to political representation in these locales and produce
two additional representatives. These municipalities have smaller concentrations of
Latinos and significant numbers of blacks and Asians. In these three cities, it seems
highly unlikely, with the possible exception of Springfield, that there could be a Latino
municipal

district for quite

some

time. In Lowell, however, a citywide coalition of

Latinos and Asians could elect a city councilor.

The models presented here
ties in

are based

on conservative

The Latino communihave surely grown since that

figures.

Massachusetts, undercounted as of the 1990 census,

time. Increased participation could be expected under alternative systems to levels

equivalent to the Latino electorates in other large states. Estimates based on the electorate in

1995 or beyond would provide much stronger arguments for the alternative sys-

tems.

Implications
This

article

has explored the prospects that modified at-large electoral systems would

provide opportunities for increased political representation of the Latino communities of

Massachusetts and that gains could be anticipated in most legislative bodies, with the
greatest increase projected for the state legislature.

There are two important implications

to these findings.

The

first is that

the propor-

tionality advocates generally overstate the gains that linguistic minorities

could achieve

through alternative systems. Roughly, the Latino share of an electorate

about half the

Latino share of the population. This

is

is

an important qualification of those claims.

The second implication is that the alternative systems appear incontrovertibly beneficial in cities and states in which political districts cannot be drawn to represent Latinos.
Deciding which electoral system is superior in instances in which districts can be drawn
deserves a more complex discussion. However, the potential benefits for all minority
groups

hood
over

in multiracial cities requires further consideration, particularly

that

one group's gain often comes

districts.

at the

given the

expense of another's in the competition

This aspect warrants further discussion, particularly given the continued

growth of Latino and Asian populations and the strategic importance of
alliances

likeli-

among

minority groups for the future of our

political

cities.

Innovative approaches to political participation are also needed. Rodolfo de la Garza

and Louis DeSipio's proposal for noncitizen voting warrants further attention within the
civil rights

community and ultimately

the U.S. Congress.
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electoral structures

cance of

on participating voters underscores the longer-term

strategic signifi-

this aspect.

The considerations

to evaluate alternative electoral systems fully vastly

exceed the

analysis of population presented here and must include questions about the shape of politics

and the structures of government in each

tions exist or

might be expected to form?

locale.

How

What

would

political alliances or coali-

the alternative structures affect the

relationship between representative and constituency, or the relationship between Latino

elected representatives, other elected representatives, and the overall structures of

power?
Electoral systems are not easily changed. Nonetheless, the history of the civil rights

movement has demonstrated

that electoral structures can be changed. Proposals to

loosen the geographic requirement for

civil rights

remedies to political underrepresenta-

tion are increasingly being heard in court. In her path-breaking analysis of U.S. electoral
politics,

Lani Guinier has proposed political structures that have been used successfully

in other countries with varying degrees of ethnic division.
lic

An

important analyst of pub-

policy and ethnic disputes in the international context concluded,

What

stands out, in spite of the limitations,

incentive structure the electoral system

has been in most countries in utilizing

is

just

how

important a piece of the

and what a dearth of imagination there

is

potential for ethnic

its

accommodation. 53

Ultimately, there will be a need to rethink the relationship between majority rule and

minority representation, as Guinier has argued. The structure of political communities
includes not merely technical decisions, but profound expressions of

approaches the inclusion of
sion of

how

its

members. This

the United States will address

its

how

a society

article seeks to stimulate further discus-

increasingly diverse electorates in the

twenty-first century.**
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